چکیده:
هدف این پژوهش تدوین پرسشنامه درک عمومی از علم و تعیین اعتبار، پایایی و هنجاریابی آن بوده است. روش پژوهش از نوع پیمایش است و از تکنیک تحلیل عاملی بهره گرفته شده است . به منظور تعیین اعتبار و هنجاریابی 384 نفر و به منظور تعیین پایایی دو نمونه 40 نفری از مردم شهر اصفهان با روش نمونهگیری سهمیهای انتخاب شدند . در این مطالعه برای تعیین اعتبار پرسشنامه درک عمومی از علم از روش اعتبار محتوا و تحلیل عاملی تاییدی (توسط نرم افزار amos ) و برای تعیین پایایی پرسشنامه از دو روش همسانی درونی و پایایی بازآزمایی استفاده شده است. یافتهها نشان داد متغیر درک عمومی از علم دارای چهار بعد اصلی« علاقه به موضوعات علمی»، «شناخت مفاهیم علمی»، «سطح دانش علمی»، «نگرش به علم و فناوری» و یازده بعد فرعی است. مدل عاملی تاییدی مرتبه دوم مربوط به سنجش درک عمومی از علم نیز، شاخصهای برازش خوبی را کسب نمود. پایایی تمام ابعاد درک عمومی از علم با استفاده از ضریب آلفای کرونباخ و ضریب بازآزمایی در حد مطلوبی قرار داشت . پایایی کل پرسشنامه نیز با آلفای کرونباخ 84/ 0 و بازآزمایی 69/ 0 در حد مطلوبی است. بنابراین، پرسشنامه تدوین شده درک عمومی از علم دارای اعتبار سازه و پایایی است و از این پس میتواند در تحقیقات اجتماعی به منظور سنجش درک عامه مردم از مفاهیم علمی استفاده شود.
In the second half of the 1980s, new concerns emerged under the title of âpublic understanding of scienceâ (PUS). This transition is marked by the influential report of the Royal Society of London in 1985. Like the previous cases, the diagnosis is that of a public deficit, who does not show sufficient support for science and this makes scientific institutions concerned. The Royal Society took the view of many of its members and assumed that better knowledge will be the driver of positive attitudes hence the axiom: âthe more you know, the more you love it. This research agenda moved away from knowledge to attitude, and concerns for scientific literacy carried over to test the expectation âthe more you know, the more you love itâ. Likewise, the emphasis shifted from a dichotomy to a continuum: one is not literate or illiterate, but rather is more or less knowledgeable. And the correlation between knowledge and attitude became the main focus of research. But the expectation that better knowledge drives positive attitudes is not confirmed. Although generally there may be some relations, there is no correlation at all when it comes controversial issues. Well and less well-informed citizens are to be found on either side of the controversy. Social psychology, though not the Royal Society, tells us that knowledge it not a driver of attitude, but a quality index: attitudes, whether positive or negative, that are based on knowledge are held more strongly and thus resist change. Well-informed and less well-informed citizens make up their minds differently, but do not necessarily come to different conclusions. PUS research extended its concepts, methods and data. Attitudes to science may be part of a general political sophistication, a public resource not specific to science. The debate over public deficits also stimulated complementary data streams, such as qualitative discourse analyses and mass media monitoring, which reveal long-term trends such as the medicalization of science news over the last 30 years. PUS had a rationalist and a realist agenda. For the rationalists, attitudes arise from information processing with a rational core. It is assumed that if people had all the information, and were able to understand probabilities, they would be more supportive of science. The battle for the public is a battle for minds with more information and the correct statistical reasoning (i.e. risk perception). For the realists, attitudes are emotional relations with the world. How emotions may relate to rationality is a vexing question. Realists understand emotions with the logic of advertising. Thus, the battle for the public mind becomes a battle for hearts. How to attract public attention? The issue becomes one of âsexing upâ the evidence. The public is the consumer who is to be seduced. In this logic, there is little difference between scientific news and washing powder. The critique of PUS again focused on the deficit models of knowledge or attitude: Negative attitudes are neither an expression of lack of knowledge nor of good judgment. However, the attribution of a public deficit expresses the timidity or even âinstitutional neuroticismâ (Brian Wynne), the diffuse anxieties and condescendence of scientific actors vis-Ã -vis the public. The public deficit model is in fact a self-fulfilling prophecy: the public, a-priori deficient, cannot be trusted. Mistrust on the part of scientific actors will be paid back in kind with public mistrust. Negative public attitudes then confirm the assumption among scientists: the public is not to be trusted. This circularity called for âsoul searchingâ among scientific actors. The aim of the current research is also to investigate validity, reliability and normalization of "public understanding of science" scale in Isfahan city.
validation, Reliability, Normalization, Public Understanding of Science