چکیده:
National interest often forms the core of bilateral ties between states. No matter how much idealism is peddled to explain the unassailability of the State’s bilateral relations, the national interests and related diplomatic preferences spawn abrasion in these ties. The change of leadership is a consequence of elections results in a national reassessment of foreign policy. This paper attempts to highlight Pakistan’s foreign policy dilemma regarding the walking of a tightrope between Tehran and Riyadh. It is argued that the balancing act of Islamabad in this triad is further complicated in the aftermath of 2013 general elections in Pakistan. The new Nawaz Sharif administration’s unveiled connection with the Saudi Kingdom, the current tides in the Saudi-Iran-U.S. triangle, and the impending and complex drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan further confounds the trajectory of Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially in the zero sum dynamics of Saudi-Iran rivalry.
خلاصه ماشینی:
S. triangle, and the impending and complex drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan further confounds the trajectory of Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially in the zero sum dynamics of Saudi-Iran rivalry.
In effect, the troubled history of Saudi-Iran ties (especially after the Islamic Revolution), sectarian war (Shia-Sunni), Pakistan’s place in the Middle East nuclear dilemma, strategies for coping with post 2014 Afghanistan, all present challenges to the Nawaz government in maintaining balanced relations with both Riyadh and Tehran.
But I argue, for further improvement in the relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and for any chance of repair in the ties between Islamabad and Washington, the issue of Iran, especially that of IPI cannot be overlooked.
Be it the rhetoric of Saudi officials related to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or Riyadh’s refusal to sign the amended version of SPQ (2005), the fact that Riyadh has not signed the missile technology control regime, and the purchase of Chinese CSS-2 missiles all he states, is either face saving in the middle Eastern politics, or the show of force against its chief adversary Iran (Wehrey, 2012: 5-6).
Afghanistan derives its significance in the Saudi foreign policy calculus from the fact that what happens in Afghanistan affects Riyadh’s ties with Pakistan and Iran.
S. Now, when key leaders in Riyadh echo doubts regarding Washington’s utility in protecting the survival of the regime against regional enemies, "Saudi Arabia supports Pakistan in its Afghan policy and – only partly in coordination with Islamabad – competes with Iran for influence in Afghanistan" Steinberg and Woermer, 2013: 2).
Pakistan, on a number of subjects concerning Iran and Saudi Arabia, struggles to manage the balance in its ties with both Riyadh and Tehran.