چکیده:
Financial crisis and sanctions because of economics problem, can do effect to companies
capital structure and financing policies that in this article we are study this subject. In this
article for determine financial crisis years we have used from development indicator of GDP
growth and methods presentation from latridis and dimitras (2013). In order to test the
hypothesis, we collecting data of 63 companies which listed in Tehran stock Exchange in
time 2006-2014.The results of this researches show us that first hypothesis said financial
crisis and sanctions have no effect to sales and so earnings before tax. With second
hypothesis earnings before tax and sales have effect to financing from capital increase, but
earnings before tax and sales have no effect to financing from receive loan. And so with
third hypothesis, financing policies of receive loan affected of financial crisis have effect to
them financial expense. By attention to statistical evidence that we got that it is contrary
with exiting evidence and too much drop Tehran Stock Exchange, we can say it is possible
that companies for maintain stability and so control of them take stock value and trusting to
shareholders and other users, perhaps they have done earnings smoothing and with use of
accounting methods and so creation of non-operation earnings they can prevention of
reduced earnings before tax some what.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The results in Table 3 imply that when facing the pressure of upward earnings management, managers may reduce R&D (which may be seen as a way to pursue a short-term target at the expense of long-term benefits), but it is more likely that managers choose to decrease other general expenses that lead to a lower level of expense stickiness.
The results show that the difference in the reduction in stickiness between the earnings-managementand non- earnings-management sub-samples is much more significant in other general expenses than inR&D or advertising expenses.
As H1 indicates, we expect a lower level of expense stickiness in the earnings-management sub-sample.
The regression results of upward earnings management on expense stickiness are reported in Table 2.
As Table 2 shows, β2 in Column (1) is positive and not statistically significant, indicating that upward earnings management decreases expense stickiness.
As Table 2 shows, β2 in Column (1) is positive and not statistically significant, indicating that upward earnings management decreases expense stickiness.
To summarize, the results in Table 5 provide evidence that expense stickiness is mainly found in the nonearnings- management sub-sample.
The value of β2 in Column (1) is statistically significant at the 1% level and that in Column (2) is not statistically significant, indicating that upward earnings management significantly reduces the stickiness of GSGA.
The value of β2 in Column (1) is statistically significant at the 1% level and that in Column (2) is not statistically significant, indicating that upward earnings management significantly reduces the stickiness of GSGA.