چکیده:
Universal human rights suffer from a lack of consensus on the question: what
kind of internal state organisation can actually take these fundamental rights
adequately into account? The main intent of this article is to present a critical
assessment of various modes of state–religion affiliation and their effects on the
state’s scope for human rights compliance. A special focus will be on the right to
freedom of religion or belief since this fundamental right is within this context
most profoundly at stake. It will be contended that states which are organised in
accordance with the principle of state neutrality can in principle fully comply
with human rights norms; while states which identify themselves either positively
with a single religious denomination or excessively negatively with religion have
to be considered poorly equipped for both democratisation as well as optimal
human rights compliance. The crucial issue of ‘multivocality’ of religions will be
addressed as a contribution to the reform debate. Ultimately a case will be made
for ‘the right to neutral governance’.
خلاصه ماشینی:
The Right to Neutral Governance, Religion, the State & the Question of Human Rights Compliance Jeroen Temperman <FootNote No="20" Text="Professor of International Law and Religion at Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands.
Another good example is the Republic of the Sudan: the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan (2005) does not contain a specific provision as to the secular or religious nature of the Sudan (as did the previous Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan (1998), which, in the first article, expressly considered Islam &amp;quot;the religion of the majority&amp;quot;); yet it can hardly be perceived as a secular state given the provision which declares Shari’a law as a source of legislation as far as the Northern states of the Sudan are concerned (art.
<FootNote No="37" Text=" States that provide for a clear-cut separation (or which have disestablished the official church/religion in the past by other legislative means), a non-establishment clause or for other provisions which approximate a formal separation include: Angola; Benin; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Chad; Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bulgaria; Brazil; Chile; Croatia; Cuba; Czech Republic; East Timor; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; France; Gabon; The Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Republic of Korea; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Liberia; Lithuania; Macedonia; Mexico; Micronesia; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Palau; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Sao Tome and Principe; Senegal; Serbia; Seychelles; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Tajikistan; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; and Venezuela.