چکیده:
It is commonly held that increasing monetary rewards enhance work effort. This study, however, argues that this will not ineludibly occur in team activities. Incentive Reversal may occur in sequential team productions featuring positive external impacts on agents. This seemingly paradoxical event is explained through two experiments in this article. The first experiment involves a sample of 182 college students who were paired in groups each playing 12 games that led to 2,184 observations. The second experiment involves a sample of 210 college students who were grouped into teams of three that involved 420 observations. The results of both experiments confirmed the occurrence of incentive reversals despite increasing monetary rewards.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Several studies have investigated free riding in team members (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982; McAfee & McMillan, 1991; Itoh, 1991; Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Legros & Matthews, 1993; Barron & Gjerde, 1997; Che & Yoo, 2001).
He shows that when production technology exerts a positive externality on peers, and agents sequentially choose their effort, then the total effort will decrease in an equilibrium in the case that rewards are increased.
3. 1 Results To study incentive reversal, first the number of times a subject exerts effort for high and low rewards is calculated.
In both sequential and simultaneous structures, incentive reversal is observed in the first subject because as the reward increases, the mean for individual effort decreases in the case of the first subject.
Result 1: According to incentive reversal, an increase in rewards leads to a decrease in effort of first subject at both sequential and simultaneous structures.
As table 2 shows, the impact of an increase in rewards on mean team production and player’s cooperation in the case of a simultaneous treatment of subjects is similar to the sequential treatment of subjects.
Result 4: In his/her decision to exert effort, the second subject considers the first subject’s decision as low individual reward increases in sequential games.
High reward in sequential games involving two players compels the second subject to ignore the first subject’s decision and merely focus on his/her own individual benefits.
This study administered OLS and probit methods in order to validate the impact of (high and low) rewards, (sequential and simultaneous) structures as well as their reciprocal influence on two subjects.