چکیده:
In Avicenna’s view, the practical intellect plays a basic and foundational role in producing moral action. By investigating this notion in the framework of Avicenna’s philosophy, we find that he regards perception and cognition as the main functions of the practical intellect. However, he considers this perception as particular, introducing it as different from the particularity of imaginary and estimative cognitions (animal perceptive faculties). This difference makes the action produced by an animal essentially different from the action produced by the practical intellect. This view, however, is contrary to the views of some other philosophers and theologians who disagree with him on the perceptive function of the practical intellect and maintain just a motivational function for it. In addition, Avicenna enumerates the following as other roles of the practical intellect in producing moral action: motivational and incentive function; dominance over motivational and inclinative (to or against) faculties, etc and being served by them; serving the speculative intellect and purifying, completing and refining the speculative intellect in the realm of the practical intellect. Many other points have also been mentioned in this regard within this article. Overall, the central role of the practical intellect in producing moral action in Avicenna’s view gives rise to other discussions regarding moral action as well, in a way that those discussions are based on, or lead to it directly or indirectly
خلاصه ماشینی:
Although Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi has been unable to explain this expression well and considers the perception of dos as a potential of the practical intellect; however, he regards its universality to be related to the speculative intellect and discusses the assistance of the practical and speculative intellects in obtaining this rational view and judgment.
In opposition to this claim, some scholars have refuted the view that the practical intellect is called intellect because of its relation to the intelligible, and believe that the difference between the perceptions of the practical and speculative intellect is the only point of their distinction, and the common point between them is rational perception; they assert that the meaning of a judgment by the practical intellect regarding the necessity of something refers to the perception of its necessity, not deriving a law (Muzaffar, vol.
In Isharat, Avicenna starts from the faculties of the rational soul (Nafs-i Natiqa) as follows: if the faculties of the soul are for managing the body, they belong to the practical intellect, and their duty is to derive matters related to actions; this, however, is only in the case of particular (not universal) matters because voluntary intentions are not acquired through universal knowledge, and it is the particulars- understanding intellect with the aid of the universals-understanding intellect that mediates in transforming universal perceptions of the speculative intellect into particular perceptions (Avicenna, 1375 AP, Vol. 2, p.
In this process, the practical faculty seeks help from the universal perceptions of the speculative intellect, and thus a particular result is achieved (Avicenna, 1405 AH, vol.