چکیده:
The issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is not only an alarming concern, but appears to be a growing threat to the international peace and security. Ballistic missiles as prominent means of delivery for such weapons have compelled international community to seek arrangements for the control or supervision over WMD delivery systems. Construction of heretofore arrangements at the international level have not been conducive to binding compliance; they have proved less than effective in preventing non-compliance. The binding nature of controlling arrangements for WMD could be either legal or political. The question is then how a non-legally binding arrangement would contribute to non-proliferation of ballistic missiles. In pursuit of an answer for this question, this article compares the Missile Technology Control Regime; the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; the Proliferation Security Initiative; and the Hague Code of Conduct so as to provide a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of political commitments among States. This article argues that States have increasingly demonstrated resistance to legally binding arrangements. In contrast, they have been more receptive to politically binding arrangements and more prone to what can be dubbed as soft law. While the effectiveness of political commitments in the community of States is a dubious debate, there, nonetheless, seems to be no alternative to a modicum of liability for achieving some kind of consented arrangement among States.
خلاصه ماشینی:
Non-Legally Binding Arrangements for Ballistic Missiles Control Saeid Baghban Kondori 1 Received: 25 January 2019 Accepted: 11 October 2019 Abstract The issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is not only an alarming concern, but appears to be a growing threat to the international peace and security.
In pursuit of an answer for this question, this article compares the Missile Technology Control Regime; the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; the Proliferation Security Initiative; and the Hague Code of Conduct so as to provide a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of political commitments among States.
Keywords: ballistic missiles, Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), political commitment, legally binding arrangements, non-proliferation, confidence building measures Doctoral researcher in International Law, University of Tehran, Iran.
Compared to other politically binding arrangements constructed by the international community in order to control, or at least supervise, ballistic missiles such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (“MTCR”), the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (“PNIs”) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”), The Hague Code of Conduct Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 1972 (SALT), Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 (ABM), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987, (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1991 (START I).
As a non-legally binding negotiated instrument, the HCOC is devised to provide some degree of confidence to the international community where there is a growing political intention to bring ballistic missiles and their related programs under a transparent controlling arrangement.
; In areas such as ballistic missiles control, where high levels of detail and specificity are required, concerns regarding political/military sensitivity and confidentiality of information are high, frequent emendation due to technological changes is needed, and other circumstantial dynamics are expected, non-legally binding forms of arrangements are likely to be more appropriate.