چکیده:
ارسطو در پژوهش عملی به اقتضای غایت آن،خیر غایی، به مفهوم آگاثون یا خیر کلی می پردازد. خیر گستره دلالتی همچون وجود دارد و در همان تعداد مقوله به کار میرود که هستی، از این رو ارسطو به تامل نظری در خیر فی نفسه، همراه با مقایسه آن با وجود می پردازد. در سیر تحلیل ارسطو از مفهوم آگاثون، میتوان هم هنگام پرسش از امکان برساختن متافیزیکی را درباب خیر با موضوع خیر بماهو خیر همسان با متافیزیک وجود و موضوع موجود بماهو موجود پی گرفت. در این سیر آشکار میشود که هر چند وجود و خیر گستره دلالت واژگانی و اطلاق مقولی همسانی دارند اما ساختار ارجاعی و اشتراک معنایی یکسانی ندارند. معناهای گوناگون هستی به یک معنای مشترک نخستین و مقولات متعددِ آن به یک مقوله اصلی باز می گردد. این معنا و مقوله اصلی و اولیه، وجود نخستین و مقوله جوهر است و دانش متافیزیکِ وجود به عنوان دانایی نخستین به علت تقویم موضوع آن، وجود نخستین، شکل میگیرد. اما میان دلالتهای گوناگون خیر هیچ معنای مشترکی وجود ندارد و خیر در هر مقوله به نحوی مستقل و بی ارتباط به سایر معانی و مقولات به کار میرود. فقدان معنای مشترک اولیه و مقوله اصلی که همه معانی و مقولات دیگر بدان بازگردند، مانع از برساخت موضوع مطلق خیر و حیث ذاتی بماهو خیر می گردد. از این رو نمیتوان همسان با هستی برای خیر متافیزیکی تصور کرد با موضوع خیر بماهو خیر که با نحوه نگرش نظری محضی همچون سوفیا در دانایی نخستین شناخته شود.
Question of the metaphysics of Goodness in the process of the Aristotle’s analysis of agathon (αγαθον)Practical research, according to Aristotle, explores to actualize Supreme Good as an ultimate end of the life. Final good could be determined if preceded by an outline which achieve by conceptual analysis. For this reason, Aristotle consider agathon (αγαθον), universal concept of Goodness, and clarify its conceptual-categorical structure to explain how we can understand it. In virtue of similarity between Good and Being for their extension of senses (Good has as many meanings as Being) Aristotle proceed to analyze Goodness comparatively to being as an absolute philosophical conception. Alongside of his comparative study of the Goodness and existence, we can consider hermeneutically, a metaphysics for Goodness similar to the metaphysics of Being and question of its possibility. Corresponding to the metaphysics of existence that consider being qua being, one can imagine a metaphysics for Goodness which contemplate on the goodness qua goodness and study its philosophical characteristics and theoretical attributes towards to question of its possibility.It appears, in the process of Aristotle’s analysis that there is a common meaning and central definite characteristic in the several significations and different categories of being by reference to a one starting-point: the primary being or substance. From the categorical point of view, in the same way, various categories as accidental qualities of a one essential category of substance. Because of the one principle of the primary being or substance there would be possible a metaphysics for being which contemplate on the Being qua Being. But Goodness, on the contrary, is used homonymous in various different senses without any common meaning and with no reference to one principle. Of the categorical attitude, goodness is applied in any individual category independently with no connection and by no reference to one main category. There is not, in fact, any category of primary good or substantial goodness which constitutes universal meaning and single category as an appropriate subject-matter for the intended knowledge of the metaphysics of goodness . Consequently it is not possible to establish one primary philosophy for goodness qua goodness same as first philosophy of being as being. Knowledge, on Aristotle, is composed of the Eidos (form or essence) as a universal absolute subject and eidetic attitude as a necessary theoretical way of understanding. Eidetic view and Eidos entity is based on the common meaning and single principle which are not found in the concept of goodness. But because of the essential transcend characteristic of the goodness as ideal conception which transcends from the real fact to the ideal value, there would be Platonic way to transfer from the eidos to the idea of goodness and from eidetic knowledge of Sophia to the ideal intuition of Dialectic. But Aristotle who does not follows dialectic neither can obtain eidetic path to goodness nor can deny it completely. Then he searches another way to understanding the goodness. Not the way of Sophia and the metaphysics of Goodness but the path of Phronesis and the practical understanding.