چکیده:
یکی از مسائل مهمی که در دوران معاصر توسط علامه طباطبایی در مباحث فلسفی راه پیدا کرده است، کاربرد برهان لمّی در دانش فلسفه است. دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی دو رویکرد مختلف از سوی فلسفهپژوهان معاصر را پدید آورده است. برخی دیدگاه ایشان را پذیرفتهاند و در مقام دفاع از آن برآمدهاند و گروهی دیگر دیدگاه ایشان را مورد نقد و ارزیابی قرار دادهاند. در جستار حاضر، تلاش شده است با روش توصیفی - تحلیلی و با رویکردی انتقادی، دیدگاه دو گروه یادشده، مورد ارزیابی و تحلیل قرار گیرد. در پایان این نتیجه بدست آمده است که دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی با وجود نوآوریهایی که دارد، بر مبانی استوار شده است که خالی از اشکال نیست. افزون بر آن، این دیدگاه بر تعریف جدیدی از برهان لمّی و إنّی استوار است که برخلاف دیدگاه رایج در دانش منطق میباشد.
A major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barahin al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy: some have endorsed and defended his view, and others have criticized the account. In this article, we draw on a descriptive-analytic method and adopt a critical approach to assess the two responses. We conclude that, notwithstanding its novelties, ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s account rests on problematic grounds. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of demonstrations propter quid and quiatic demonstrations (al-barahin al-inniyya) , which go against the common conception of these demonstrations in Islamic logic. Keywords: ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi, critique, propter quid demonstration (al-burhan al-limmi) , quiatic demonstration (al-burhan al-inni) , general implications Introduction Propter quid demonstration (al-burhan al-limmi) and quiatic demonstration (al-burhan al-inni) are major issues in Islamic logic, which are deployed in other fields of study, including Islamic philosophy. In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi was the first to propound the idea that propter quid demonstrations are not legitimate in dealing with philosophical problems. On his account, the demonstrations or proofs used in coping with philosophical questions are general implications (al-mulazamat al-ʿamma) , as it is indeed impossible to use propter quid demonstrations in philosophy. ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s account has been criticized by some of his students and contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy. Some have endorsed and defended his view, whereas others have criticized its foundations or raised objections against it by its own merits. The basic question of the present research is as follows: How to assess the arguments for and against ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view of the deployment of propter quid demonstrations in philosophy? Method of Research In this research, we provide an accurate rereading of the definitions of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations in Islamic logic, and then assess the views of both camps. We begin with an account of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view as well as the positions of his proponents and opponents. Finally, having evaluated both views, we elaborate upon our espoused account. This research is done with a descriptive-analytic method and a critical approach. Discussion In some of his works, ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi suggests that propter quid demonstrations do not apply to philosophy. Indeed, all demonstrations or proofs in philosophy are quiatic demonstrations based on general implications. In his view, propter quid demonstrations cannot be deployed in dealing with philosophical problems. This is because the absolute existence (al-wujud al-mutlaq) as the subject-matter of philosophy is general, and since there is nothing beyond the absolute existence, it cannot have a cause, which implies that it cannot be subject to propter quid demonstrations, in which causes are adduced. With a survey of the debates over ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s account among contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy, we find two major approaches: some have criticized ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view, and some have defended and justified the view. Javadi Amoli raises two objections against ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s position. He holds that the predicate of existence is predicated of both absolute and qualified (muqayyad) existences, and when it is predicated of the latter, it can be subject to propter quid demonstrations, since qualified existence needs a cause. In addition, if propter quid demonstrations did not apply to philosophical problems, then all demonstrations in philosophy would be undermined and there would be no conclusive argument in philosophy, because quiatic demonstrations are grounded indeed in propter quid demonstrations. Given ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s response to Javadi Amoli’s objections, it turns out that his view presupposes his own account of the “criterion of philosophical problems. ” However, the second objection raised by Javadi Amoli seems to go through. Mesbah Yazdi has also criticized ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view based on its incompatibility with the conditions of propter quid demonstrations in logic. He argues that causation in such demonstrations is not confined to external causation, but includes analytic causation as well. Accordingly, ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view is objectionable. In this research, we endorse Mesbah Yazdi’s critique of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view. Gholam-Reza Fayyazi believes that ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view should be examined in terms of his own assumptions. One such assumption is that all predicates that are more specific than the absolute existence equal existence when taken together with their complement notions. Moreover, in propter quid demonstrations, the middle term is indeed an external cause for the predication of the major premise on the minor premise. In Fayyazi’s view, the first assumption—equality of the “essential accident” (al-‘arad al-dhati) with the subject-matter of a science—finds counterexamples in many philosophical problems, and the second contradicts the views of logicians, since they believe that the causation of the middle term in propter quid demonstrations includes both external and mental causation. In this research, we criticize Fayyazi’s first objection against ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view, but we agree with the second objection, which is a reformulation of Mesbah Yazdi’s view. Yazdanpanah endorses ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s assumptions, but he argues that they have their source in the idea of a cause beyond the existent qua existent. However, since this idea is problematic, ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view is challenged. A reflection on Yazdanpanah’s remarks makes it obvious that they are reformulations the objections raised by Mesbah Yazdi and Javadi Amoli. Finally, people such as Samadi Amoli believe that ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view should be deemed intuitive (shuhudi) , while all the objections raised against his view assume that philosophy is confined to reflective or intellectual knowledge. In this research, we criticize Samadi Amoli because it does not square with ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s account to take it as pertaining to intuitive, rather than acquired, knowledge. Conclusion Having assessed and examined the arguments for and against ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s account, we conclude that, despite its novel contributions, his view rests on problematic assumptions. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations that goes against the standard view in logic. Thus, we should either modify the standard logic definition of propter quid demonstrations or believe that ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s view is a novel view based on new principles, which can be criticized.
خلاصه ماشینی:
بـه دیگـر سـخن ، اگـر محمول فلسفی مساوی با موضوع فلسفه باشد، علـت محمـول فلسـفی نیـز برابـر بـا علـت موضوع فلسفه خواهد بود و چون موضوع فلسفه ، موجود مطلـق اسـت و فراتـر از موجـود مطلق ، چیزی نیست تا علت آن باشد، پس موضـوع فلسـفه علتـی خـارج از خـود نخواهـد داشت و لازمه این سخن ، راه نیافتن برهان لمّی در مسائل فلسفی است !
١. ٦ وجود علت برای موجود مقید استاد جوادی آملی در نامه ای به علامه طباطبایی درباره نادرسـتی نظریـه «ناکارآمـدی برهـان لمّی در فلسفه » چنین مینویسد: حدوسط در برهان لمی، علت ثبوت محمول برای موضوع است نه علـت ثبـوت خـود موضوع ، بنابراین تلازمی میان ایـن دو نیسـت و در صـورت عـدم تـلازم ، برهـان لمّـی جایگاه خود را در علم فلسفه بدست میآورد، موید این نکته برخـی از مسـائل فلسـفی میباشد که با برهان لمّی استدلال شده است هر چند حدوسط معلـول وجـود موضـوع قرار بگیرد، ناکارآمدی برهان لمّی در صورتی است که وجود، فقط از آن موجود مطلـق دانسته شود و از همین رو علت نخواهد داشت ولی اگر وجود بـرای وجـود مقیـد نیـز دانسته شود، علت خواهد داشت .
(مصباح یزدی ١٣٨٧: ٦٤ -٦٥) استاد مصباح یزدی در ادامه چنین بیان میدارد که براساس شروط یادشده ، دیدگاه علامـه طباطبایی متقن نیست ؛ زیرا سخن علامه بر این مبنـا اسـتوار اسـت کـه اولا، حـد وسـط در خارج ، علت خود اکبر است نه ثبوت اکبر برای اصغر و ثانیـا، علیـت را در علیـت خـارجی میان دو شی ء منحصر دانسته اند و نتیجه گرفته اند که برهان لمّـی در فلسـفه راه نـدارد!