خلاصه ماشینی:
"5. Conclusion We have shown that the black market exchange rate in Iran can be modelled in a PPP framework once the effects of the revolution, war and oil revenue are taken into account.
Since the revolution higher oil revenue appears to have generated extra demand for imports and deflected domestic production away from exports, so that in the long run the exchange rate has tended to depreciate.
Before the revolution the economy was growing rapidly, import substitution was being encouraged and foreign currency reserves were plentiful, thus extra demand was met by increased domestic production with little consequence for the exchange rate.
Johansen results show that even conditional oil revenue purchasing power parity does not hold even though the black market exchange rate, relative prices and oil revenue constitute a co integrating vector.
Portfolio adjustment following the revolution and war 2 also depreciated the free market rate as Iranian assets were frozen and capital fled Iran either to find safer investments or as the emigrants turned to the black market to obtain foreign currency.
In the short-run other factors are likely to be dominant, such as capital flows, productivity shocks, foreign currency earnings, and where a parallel market exists (such as in Iran) the interaction between the official exchange rate, official reserves and the black market price.
We find evidence supporting the strong version of PPP; the exchange rate, domestic and foreign prices constitute a unit co integrating vector, once we permit an asymmetric long run influence for oil revenue."