خلاصه ماشینی:
"Before offering a brief review of the argument of the virtue ethicists against deontology and considering how this can be transferred to the issue of practical reasoning, however, several more general points need to be mentioned regarding the decision theoretic approach to rationality, even in the reformed and expanded guise presented by Nozick.
As with his discussion of EEU, Nozick seems to assume that the incorporation of SU in the calculation of decision value provides a more adequate theory of rational choice, although he does not provide any means of distinguishing rational from irrational behavior performed because of symbolic utility.
Although Nozick argued that evidential, causal and symbolic factors should all be weighted to determine total decision value, I have argued that Nozick has provided us with reason to Finally, and less obscurely, Nozick argues that the attempt to include symbolic utilities among the outcomes of actions is not feasible within the decision-tree framework of rational choice theory because this framework requires that outcomes have fixed conditional utilities regardless of the position on the tree from which the outcome is reached, whereas symbolic utilities are sensitive to differences in the constellation of choices through which one may reach a given outcome.
One might grant Nozick this point, but nevertheless call for the reform of decision theory not by considering the symbolic value of actions as something in addition to normal expected utility, but by requiring an assignment of the initial utilities of outcomes which is sensitive to the issues of what other acts are available, etc."