چکیده:
در این مقاله نخست به بررسی نقش انتظارات عقلایی، نقد لوکاس و مسئله ناکارآمدی سیاستی در کاربردهای اقتصادی نظریه کنترل بهینه می پردازیم و سپس ناسازگاری زمانی در کنترل بهینهء مدل های اقتصاد کلان با انتظارات عقلایی را بررسی می کنیم. تاثیر «اعتبار و حسن شهرت» و فضای تصادفی بر مسئله ناسازگاری در انتخاب پویا، و این سئوال که چگونه پیشرفت های نظری در کنترل بهینه مدل های اقتصاد کلان با انتظارات آینده نگر می تواند دستاوردهایی برای ساخت مدل های اقتصاد سنجی داشته باشد از دیگر مباحثی است که در این مقاله به آن پرداخته شده است. این مقاله مبتنی بر نگرش تاریخی می باشد و قلمرو تجزیه و تحلیل، محدود به مطالعه دستاوردهای قرن بیستم میلادی است.
In this paper، we first consider the role of rational expectations، the Lucas critique and the policy ineffectiveness debate in economic applications of optimal control theory. The problem of time-inconsistency in optimal control of macro-economic models with rational expectations will then be analyzed. The impact of reputation and the stochastic environment on the problem of inconsistency in dynamic choice together with the question of how can the developments in optimal control of macroeconomic models with forward-looking expectations contribute to the practice of econometric model building are the other topics which are discussed. We have adopted a historical approach in this paper، and the scope of our analysis is confined to the basic contributions made in the 20th Century.
خلاصه ماشینی:
"2. Rational Expectations, the Lucas Critique and the Policy Infectiveness Debate In an engineering approach to economic applications of optimal control theory, it is usually assumed that the behavior of an economic agent does not depend upon the anticipation of future events including the future course of policy actions.
3. Time-inconsistency and the Optimal Control of Macro- econometric Models with Rational Expectations The problem of ensuring consistency in dynamic choice was first addressed in a seminal paper by Strotz (1956).
Whilst the Stackelberg assumption appears to be more satisfactory in explaining government- private sector's behavior in macro-econometric models, the policy- maker, under the Nash assumption, should ensure that the expectations are consistent with the optimized policies since with rational expectations hypothesis economic agents understand and correctly anticipate the policy-makers' policies.
5. Rational Expectations and Optimization in Econometric Modeling in Practice Lessons from the repeated-game literature together with the advances in reputational equilibrium, strategic behavior involving memory, stochastic environments in game theory and information structure of games have substantially enriched the literature on economic policy optimization with forward-looking expectations.
Gaines and Paul Levine (1991), "Macroeconomic Policy Using Large Econometric Rational Expectations Models: Methodology and Application", Oxford Economic Papers,vol.
Currie, David and Paul Levine (1982), "A Solution Technique for Discrete and Continuous Time Stochastic Dynamic Models under Rational Expectations with Full and Partial Information Sets", Queen Mary College, Department of Economics, Program of Research into Small Macro-models (PRISM), Research Paper no.
Levine, Paul and David Currie (1987), "The Design of Feedback Rules in Linear Stochastic Rational Expectations Models",Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,vol."